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Secure Degrees of Freedom of the Gaussian
Diamond-Wiretap Channel
Si-Hyeon Lee, Wanyao Zhao, and Ashish Khisti
Abstract
In this paper, we consider the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel that consists of an orthogonal
broadcast channel from a source to two relays and a Gaussian fast-fading multiple access-wiretap channel
from the two relays to a legitimate destination and an eavesdropper. For the multiple access part, we
consider both the case with full channel state information (CSI) and the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI,
at the relays and the legitimate destination. For both the cases, we establish the exact secure degrees of
freedom and generalize the results for multiple relays.
For the converse part, we introduce a new technique of capturing the trade-off between the message
rate and the amount of individual randomness injected at each relay. In the achievability part, we show
(i) how to strike a balance between sending message symbols and common noise symbols from the
source to the relays in the broadcast component and (ii) how to combine artificial noise-beamforming
and noise-alignment techniques at the relays in the multiple access component. In the case with full CSI,
we propose a scheme where the relays simultaneously beamform common noise signals in the null space
of the legitimate destination’s channel, and align them with the message signals at the eavesdropper. In
the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, we present a scheme that efficiently utilizes the broadcast links by
incorporating computation between the message and common noise symbols at the source. Finally, most
of our achievability and converse techniques can also be adapted to the Gaussian (non-fading) channel
model.
I. INTRODUCTION
A model of wiretap channel was first studied by Wyner [1], where a source wishes to send its message
to a legitimate destination while keeping it secret from an eavesdropper. Wyner established the secrecy
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2capacity for the degraded case where the eavesdropper receives a physically degraded version of the
channel output at the legitimate destination. Csisza´r and Ko¨rner generalized his work to general, not
necessarily degraded, discrete memoryless wiretap channel [2]. This line of work has been subsequently
extended to various multi-user scenarios, see e.g., [3]–[15], however, the characterization of the secrecy
capacity remains a challenging open problem in general. In fact, even for the seemingly simple case
of the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, the secrecy capacity is only known for the degraded
case [8].
Recently, as an alternative but insightful measure, the secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) has been
actively studied [16]–[19] for various multi-user wiretap networks. For the Gaussian multiple access-
wiretap channel, the sum secure d.o.f. was shown to be 23 for almost all channel gains [17]. For
achievability, a cooperative jamming scheme was proposed that incorporates real interference alignment
[20] at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper. In many practical scenarios, however, it is hard
for the source and the legitimate destination to know the eavesdropper’s channel state information (CSI).
In [19], the secure d.o.f. with no eavesdropper’s CSI was characterized for some interesting one-hop
wiretap channels. For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, the sum secure d.o.f. was shown
in [19] to reduce to 12 with no eavesdropper’s CSIT, which is achieved by a blind cooperative jamming
scheme. We note that the prior work has focused on one-hop wiretap networks, and to the best of our
knowledge, there has been no prior work on the secure d.o.f. for multi-hop wiretap networks.
In this paper, we consider the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel illustrated in Fig. 1 that consists of
an orthogonal broadcast channel from a source to two relays and a Gaussian multiple access-wiretap
channel from the two relays to a legitimate destination and an eavesdropper. We consider both the case
where the relays and the legitimate destination know the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper’s CSI and
the case where they know only the legitimate CSI, which we call the case with full CSI and the case
with no eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively.1 The proposed setting is a two-hop communication network
and involves several new elements not present in the single-hop networks studied previously. Our model
introduces a new possibility of utilizing common message and/or common noise for the Gaussian multiple
access-wiretap channel. This brings in an interesting tension in the use of the broadcast links regarding
whether we send independent messages, common message, common noise, or a function of those across
the broadcast part. At one extreme, when the capacities of the orthogonal links in the broadcast part are
1We assume that the source does not know any of the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper’s CSI and the eavesdropper knows
both the CSI’s.
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Figure 1. The Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel.
sufficiently small, the optimal strategy turns out to send independent partial message to each relay and
incorporate jamming schemes [17], [19] for the multiple access part. At the other extreme, when the
broadcast part has sufficiently high capacity to transmit common message or common noise symbols to
the relays, without incurring bottleneck, it follows that the secure d.o.f. equals 1 using the results [21]–[23]
for the multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel. When the link capacities of the broadcast
part are moderate, however, the optimal scheme is not immediate. Furthermore, due to the possibility
of sending common information across the broadcast part, we cannot assume in proving converse that
the channel inputs and outputs at the relays are independent, whereas channel inputs at transmitters are
inherently independent in most one-hop wiretap networks.
On the other hand, with no secrecy constraint, our model falls back to the diamond channel introduced
by Schein [24], whose capacity is not known in general. For a range of moderate link capacities at the
broadcast part, [25], [26] characterized the capacity of the diamond channel, which is strictly tighter
than the cutset bound. For achievability, a coding scheme incorporating multicoding at the source was
proposed in [25], [26]. For converse, [26] used a technique from [27] to take into account the correlation
between the two relay signals. In the presence of a secrecy constraint, such converse proof techniques
need to be adopted carefully by taking into account the stochastic encoding functions introduced to
confuse the eavesdropper. Those works [25], [26] were generalized in [28] for the degraded Gaussian
diamond-wiretap channel, in which the secrecy capacity was characterized for several ranges of channel
parameters. For non-degraded case, however, the coding scheme used in [28] achieves zero secure d.o.f.
and structured codes such as interference alignment and beamforming schemes need to be involved to
achieve a positive secure d.o.f.
For the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel in Fig. 1, we establish the exact secure d.o.f. in terms of the
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4link d.o.f.’s at the broadcast part, both for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper’s
CSI. We assume a fast fading scenario where channel fading coefficients are i.i.d. across the time, but our
converse result for the former case and achievability results for both the cases continue to hold when the
channel gains are fixed. For the converse part, we combine the proof techniques in [17], [19], [29] with a
new technique capturing the trade-off between the message rate and the amount of individual randomness
injected at each relay. Our achievability part is based on five key constituent schemes. In particular, we
propose two new schemes that utilize common noise, in a way that the common noise signals are beam-
formed in the null space of the legitimate destination’s channel. One of these two schemes is for the
case with full CSI and is called a simultaneous alignment and beamforming (S-AB) scheme, which
incorporates alignment of the message and the common noise signals at the eavesdropper. The proposed
S-AB scheme also extends easily to the case with more than two relays and yields the best achievable
secure d.o.f. The other scheme is for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI and is called a computation
for jamming (CoJ) scheme, which efficiently utilizes the broadcast links by incorporating computation
between the message and the common noise symbols at the source. The remaining three schemes are
straightforward extensions of the previously known schemes, i.e., the cooperative jamming scheme [17]
and blind cooperative jamming scheme [19] for the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel and the
message-beamforming scheme [21], [22] for the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel.
As a natural extension, we also consider a generalized Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with more
than two relays. For the brevity of the results, we consider the symmetric case where the link d.o.f.’s
of the broadcast part are the same. By generalizing the proof techniques used in the two-relay case, we
establish the exact secure d.o.f. for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI and present upper and lower
bounds on the secure d.o.f. for the case with full CSI.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formally present the model of
the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel. Our main results on the secure d.o.f. are given in Section III. In
Sections IV and V, we prove the converse and the achievability parts, respectively. We extend the results
for the case with multiple relays in Section VI. We conclude this paper in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel illustrated in Fig. 1 that consists of a broadcast channel
from a source to two relays and a Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel from the two relays to a
legitimate destination and an eavesdropper. For the broadcast part, the source is connected to the two
relays through orthogonal links of capacities C1 and C2. For the multiple access part, the channel outputs
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5Y1(t) and Y2(t) at time t at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, are given as
Y1(t) = h1(t)X1(t) + h2(t)X2(t) +N1(t) (1)
Y2(t) = g1(t)X1(t) + g2(t)X2(t) +N2(t), (2)
where X1(t) and X2(t) are the channel inputs from relays 1 and 2, respectively, hk(t) and gk(t) for
k = 1, 2 are the channel fading coefficients to the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively,
and N1(t) and N2(t) are independent Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance at the legitimate
destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, at time t. The transmit power constraint at relay k = 1, 2
is given as 1
n
∑n
t=1X
2
k(t) ≤ P , where n denotes the number of channel uses.
We assume a fast fading scenario where h1(t), h2(t), g1(t), and g2(t) are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion
over time according to an arbitrary real-valued joint density function f(h1, h2, g1, g2), whose all joint
and conditional density functions are bounded and whose support set does not include zero and infinity,
i.e., there exists a positive finite L such that
1
L
≤ |hk(t)|, |gk(t)| ≤ L. (3)
We note that (3) is a mild technical condition because by choosing L large enough, the omitted support
set can be reduced to a negligible probability that has a vanishing impact on the degrees of freedom. For
notational convenience, let ht = [h1(1) h2(1) · · · h1(t) h2(t)] and gt = [g1(1) g2(1) · · · g1(t) g2(t)]
denote the legitimate channel state information (CSI) and the eavesdropper’s CSI up to time t, respectively.
We assume that the source does not know any of the legitimate CSI and the eavesdropper’s CSI and
the eavesdropper knows both the CSI’s. Two cases are considered regarding the availability of CSI at
the relays and the legitimate destination. First, we consider a case where both the legitimate CSI and
the eavesdropper’s CSI are available at the two relays and the legitimate destination, which we call the
case with full CSI. We also consider another case where only the legitimate CSI is available at the two
relays and the legitimate destination, which we call a case with no eavesdropper’s CSI. We note that our
achievability and converse techniques for the case with full CSI and our achievability technique for the
case with no eavesdropper’s CSI can be adapted for the scenario with fixed channel gains over time and
for the scenario with complex channel fading coefficients, as remarked at the end of Section III.
A (2nR, n) secrecy code consists of a message W ∼ Unif[1 : 2nR],2 a stochastic encoder at the source
that (randomly) maps W ∈ [1 : 2nR] to (J1, J2) ∈ [1 : 2nC1 ] × [1 : 2nC2 ], a stochastic encoder at time
2[i : j] for two integers i and j denotes the set {i, i+1, · · · , j} and Unif[S] for a set S denotes the uniform distribution over
S. When S = [i : j], we use Unif[i : j] instead of Unif[[i : j]].
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6t = 1, . . . , n at relay k = 1, 2 that (randomly) maps (Jk,ht,gt) and (Jk,ht) for the case with full CSI
and for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively, to Xk(t) ∈ Xk, and a decoding function at
the legitimate destination that maps (Y n1 ,hn,gn) and (Y n1 ,hn) for the case with full CSI and for the
case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively, to Wˆ ∈ [1 : 2nR]. The probability of error is given as
P
(n)
e = P (Wˆ 6= W ). A secrecy rate of R is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n)
codes such that limn→∞ P (n)e = 0 and limn→∞ 1nI(W ;Y
n
2 |hn,gn) = 0.3 The secrecy capacity is the
supremum of all achievable secrecy rates.
In this paper, we are interested in asymptotic behavior of the secrecy capacity when P tends to infinity.
We say a d.o.f. tuple (α1, α2, ds) is achievable if a rate R with ds = limP→∞ R1
2
logP
is achievable when
C1 and C2 satisfy
α1 = lim
P→∞
C1
1
2 logP
, α2 = lim
P→∞
C2
1
2 logP
.
A secure d.o.f. ds(α1, α2) is the maximum ds such that (α1, α2, ds) is achievable. For brevity, ds denotes
ds(α1, α2) according to the context. Without loss of generality, let us assume C1 ≥ C2, which implies
α1 ≥ α2.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we state our main results of this paper. The following two theorems present the secure
d.o.f. of the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel for the case with full CSI and for the case with no
eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively, whose proofs are in Section IV for the converse parts and in Section
V for the achievability parts.
Theorem 1. The secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with full CSI at the relays and
the legitimate destination is equal to
ds = min
{
α1 + α2,
α2 + 1
2
, 1
}
. (4)
Theorem 2. The secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with no eavesdropper’s CSI at
the relays and the legitimate destination is equal to
ds = min
{
α1 + α2,
α1 + α2 + 1
3
,
α2 + 1
2
, 1
}
. (5)
We note that the secure d.o.f. of the classical Gaussian wiretap channel is zero. Theorems 1 and 2 show
that the secure d.o.f. can be greatly improved by deploying relays. First, note that even if α2 = 0, the
3Note that there is no secrecy constraint at the relays.
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7secure d.o.f. of 12 is achievable as long as α1 ≥ 12 , both for the case with full CSI and for the case with
no eavesdropper’s CSI. This is because relay 2 can act as a helper [19] that enables to produce a jamming
signal in cooperation with relay 1. We also note that when each of α1 and α2 is higher than or equal to
1, one secure d.o.f. is achievable for both the cases. For the case with full CSI, this is natural from the
known results [21], [22] for the Gaussian multiple-input single-output (MISO) wiretap channel, where
the source has two antennas and each of the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper has one antenna.
In this Gaussian MISO wiretap channel, one secure d.o.f. is achievable by beamforming the message
signal in the null space of the eavesdropper’s channel. Similarly, if the source can send the message
with d.o.f. 1 to both the relays for our diamond-wiretap channel, the relays are able to beam-form the
message signals in the null space of the eavesdropper’s channel. However, with no eavesdropper’s CSI,
this is not immediate from the known results for the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel. The secure d.o.f.
of the Gaussian MISO wiretap channel is still 1 with no eavesdropper’s CSI [23], but it is achieved by
sending an artificial noise signal in the null space of the legitimate destination in addition to the message
signal. To translate this scheme to our diamond-wiretap channel, the source needs to send to the relays
common artificial noise as well as (partial) messages, which requires α1 ≥ 1, α2 ≥ 1, and α1+α2 ≥ 3. To
achieve (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1), we propose a novel scheme that incorporates computation of the message
and artificial noise symbols at the source. This scheme involves transmitting a judicious function of the
message and noise symbols from the source such that we only require (α1, α2) = (1, 1), yet accomplish
noise-beamforming as discussed above.
For the special case of symmetric link capacities, i.e., α1 = α2 = α, the secure d.o.f.’s are given as
min
{
2α,
α+ 1
2
, 1
}
,min
{
2α,
2α+ 1
3
, 1
}
for the case with full CSI and for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively. Note that the gain
in secure d.o.f. with respect to α is double up to α = 13 and α =
1
4 for the case with full CSI and for
the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively. In this range, the broadcast part is the bottleneck and
hence it is optimal to send independent partial messages to the relays and to incorporate the cooperative
jamming [17] and the blind cooperative jamming [19] for the case with full CSI and for the case with no
eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively. After this threshold value of α, the source needs to send some common
information (same message or common artificial noise) to achieve a higher secure d.o.f. and this causes
the reduction of the gain in secure d.o.f. with respect to α. In Section VI, we investigate the effect of
the absence of the eavesdropper’s CSI on the secure d.o.f. for a generalized model with multiple relays.
Remark 1. For the scenario where the channel fading coefficients are fixed during the whole communi-
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8cation, the lower and upper bounds on the secure d.o.f for the case with full CSI in Theorem 1 and the
lower bound on the secure d.o.f. for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI in Theorem 2 continue to hold
for almost all channel gains. For an upper bound with no eavesdropper’s CSI, a key result from [29]
used for the upper bound in Theorem 2, i.e., the entropy of the channel output at the eavesdropper is at
least as large as that at the legitimate destination, does not seem to be immediately generalized to the
scenario with fixed channel gains.
Remark 2. We note that our achievability results can be generalized for complex channel fading coeffi-
cients by applying Lemma 7 of [30] in our analysis of interference alignment. Also, our converse result
for the case with full CSI can be generalized for complex channel fading coefficients in a straightforward
manner.
IV. CONVERSE
For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, it is shown in Section 4.2.1 of [19] that there is no
loss of secure d.o.f. if we consider the following deterministic model with integer-input and integer-output,
instead of the model (1)-(2) in Section II:
Y1(t) =
2∑
k=1
⌊hk(t)Xk(t)⌋, Y2(t) =
2∑
k=1
⌊gk(t)Xk(t)⌋ (6)
with the constraint
Xk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊
√
P ⌋}, k = 1, 2 (7)
where ⌊·⌋ denotes the floor function.
Likewise, it can be shown that there is no loss of secure d.o.f. in considering the deterministic model
(6) and (7) for the multiple access part in our Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel.4 Hence, in this section,
let us assume that the multiple access part is given as (6) and (7). In this section, ci’s for i = 1, 2, 3, . . .
are used to denote positive constants that do not depend on n and P . We note that hn,gn are known
to the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper for the case with full CSI. For the case with no
eavesdropper’s CSI, we assume gn in addition to hn is available at the legitimate destination, which
only possibly increases the secure d.o.f. Hence, hn,gn are conditioned in every entropy and mutual
information terms in this section, but are omitted for notational convenience.
4We omit a formal proof as it is identical to that in Section 4.2.1 of [19].
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9A. Proof for the converse part of Theorem 1
From the cut-set bound, we can easily obtain
ds ≤ min{α1 + α2, 1}. (8)
Hence, it remains to show ds ≤ α2+12 . By applying the Fano’s inequality, we have
nR ≤ I(W ;Y n1 ) + nc2
(a)
≤ I(W ;Y n1 )− I(W ;Y n2 ) + nc3
≤ I(W ;Y n1 , Y n2 )− I(W ;Y n2 ) + nc3
= I(W ;Y n1 |Y n2 ) + nc3
≤ H(Y n1 |Y n2 ) + nc3
= H(Y n1 , Y
n
2 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc3
≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 , Y n1 , Y n2 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc3
≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 ) +H(Y n1 , Y n2 |Xn1 ,Xn2 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc3
(b)
= H(Xn1 ,X
n
2 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc3, (9)
where (a) is from the secrecy constraint and (b) is because a deterministic model in (6) is assumed in
this section. To bound H(Y n2 ) in (9), it follows that
H(Y n2 ) = H
({ 2∑
i=1
⌊gi(t)Xi(t)⌋
}n
t=1
)
≥ H({
2∑
i=1
⌊gi(t)Xi(t)⌋
}n
t=1
∣∣Xn2 )
= H
({⌊g1(t)X1(t)⌋}nt=1
∣∣Xn2 )
= H(Xn1 ,
{⌊g1(t)X1(t)⌋}nt=1|Xn2 )−H(Xn1 |
{⌊g1(t)X1(t)⌋}nt=1,Xn2 )
= H(Xn1 |Xn2 )−H(Xn1 |
{⌊g1(t)X1(t)⌋}nt=1,Xn2 )
≥ H(Xn1 |Xn2 )−
n∑
t=1
H(X1(t)|⌊g1(t)X1(t)⌋)
(a)
≥ H(Xn1 |Xn2 )− nc4, (10)
where (a) is from Lemma 2 of [19].5
5We note that the constraint in Lemma 2 of [19] is satisfied under our channel model.
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10
Now continuing (9) with (10) substituted, we have
nR ≤ H(Xn2 ) + nc5
≤ H(Xn2 , J2) + nc5
= H(J2) +H(X
n
2 |J2) + nc5. (11)
Note that the term H(Xn2 |J2) signifies the amount of individual randomness injected at relay 2. Such
individual randomness cannot be too large because of the reliability constraint at the receiver. To capture
the trade-off between the rate R and H(Xn2 |J2), we again start from the Fano’s inequality to get
nR ≤ I(W ;Y n1 ) + nc2
≤ I(J1, J2;Y n1 ) + nc2
= H(Y n1 )−H(Y n1 |J1, J2) + nc2. (12)
For the term H(Y n1 |J1, J2), we have
H(Y n1 |J1, J2) = H
({ 2∑
i=1
⌊hi(t)Xi(t)⌋
}n
t=1
|J1, J2
)
≥ H({
2∑
i=1
⌊hi(t)Xi(t)⌋
}n
t=1
|J1, J2,Xn1
)
= H
({⌊h2(t)X2(t)⌋}nt=1|J1, J2,Xn1
)
= H(Xn2 ,
{⌊h2(t)X2(t)⌋}nt=1|J1, J2,Xn1 )−H(Xn2 |
{⌊h2(t)X2(t)⌋}nt=1, J1, J2,Xn1 )
= H(Xn2 |J1, J2,Xn1 )−H(Xn2 |
{⌊h2(t)X2(t)⌋}nt=1, J1, J2,Xn1 )
≥ H(Xn2 |J1, J2,Xn1 )−
n∑
t=1
H(X2(t)|⌊h2(t)X2(t)⌋)
(a)
≥ H(Xn2 |J1, J2,Xn1 )− nc6
(b)
= H(Xn2 |J2)− nc6, (13)
where (a) is from Lemma 2 in [19] and (b) is due to the Markov chain Xn2 − J2− (Xn1 , J1). Therefore,
by substituting (13) in (12), we obtain
nR ≤ H(Y n1 )−H(Xn2 |J2) + nc7. (14)
Combining (11) and (14), we have
2nR ≤ H(J2) +H(Y n1 ) + nc8.
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11
Hence, we have
R ≤ 1
2
(
1
2
logP + C2
)
+ c9,
and, in turn,
ds ≤ 1
2
(1 + α2).
Combining with (8), we finish the proof for the converse part of Theorem 1.
B. Proof for the converse part of Theorem 2
Note that (9) continue to hold for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI. Continuing with (9), it follows
that
nR ≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc10
≤ H(Xn1 ,Xn2 , J1, J2)−H(Y n2 ) + nc10
= H(J1, J2) +H(X
n
1 ,X
n
2 |J1, J2)−H(Y n2 ) + nc10
≤ H(J1) +H(J2) +H(Xn1 |J1) +H(Xn2 |J2)−H(Y n2 ) + nc10. (15)
By applying similar steps as those to derive (14), we can obtain
nR ≤ H(Y n1 )−H(Xnk |Jk) + nc11, k = 1, 2. (16)
Continuing with (15) substituted by (16) for k = 1, 2, we have
3nR ≤ H(J1) +H(J2) + 2H(Y n1 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc12
For the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, it is shown in Section 5 of [29] that the difference H(Y n1 )−
H(Y n2 ) can not be larger than n · o(log P ).6 Therefore, we have
3nR ≤ H(J1) +H(J2) +H(Y n1 ) + nc12 + n · o(log P )
which derives that
ds ≤ α1 + α2 + 1
3
.
Since the bound on ds for the case with full CSI continues to hold for the case with no eavesdropper’s
CSI, we finish the proof for the converse part of Theorem 2.
6The channel assumption in [29] is satisfied under our channel model.
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V. ACHIEVABILITY
The direct parts of Theorems 1 and 2 are proved by first identifying a few key constituent schemes
and then time-sharing among them appropriately. Let us first provide a high-level description of those
schemes and then give a detailed one. First, the following three schemes require the eavesdropper’s CSI
at the relays and the legitimate destination, whose operations are illustrated in Fig. 2.
• [Scheme 1 achieving (α1, α2, ds) = (13 , 13 , 23). Incorporation of cooperative jamming [17]]:
The message with d.o.f. 23 is split into two independent partial messages each with d.o.f.
1
3 . The
source sends a partial message to each relay in a way that each relay has a different partial message,
which requires α1 = α2 = 13 . Then, the relays operate according to the cooperative jamming scheme
[17] for the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, which is briefly explained in the following.
Each relay sends independent partial message (d.o.f. 13 ) together with its own noise (d.o.f. 13 ) in a
way that the noise signals are aligned at the legitimate destination and a partial message signal sent
from a relay is aligned with and is perfectly masked by the noise signal sent from the other relay
at the eavesdropper.
• [Scheme 2 achieving (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1). Incorporation of message-beamforming [21], [22]]:
The source sends the message with d.o.f. 1 to both the relays, which requires α1 = α2 = 1. Both
the relays send the message cooperatively in a way that the message signals are beam-formed in the
null space of the eavesdropper’s channel.
• [Scheme 3 achieving (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1). Simultaneous alignment and beamforming (S-AB)]:
The message with d.o.f. 1 is split into two independent partial messages each with d.o.f. 12 . The
source sends a partial message together with a common noise with d.o.f. 12 to each relay, which
requires α1 = α2 = 1. Then, each relay sends independent partial message (d.o.f. 12 ) and common
noise (d.o.f. 12 ) in a way that the common noise signals are beam-formed in the null space of the
legitimate destination’s channel and the partial message signals are aligned with and are perfectly
masked by the common noise signal at the eavesdropper. Although this scheme achieves the same
d.o.f. tuple as for Scheme 2, it outperforms Scheme 2 for more than two relays as remarked in
Section VI.
Next, the following two schemes operate with no eavesdropper’s CSI at the relays and the legitimate
destination, which are illustrated in Fig. 3.
• [Scheme 4 achieving (α1, α2, ds) = (12 , 0, 12). Incorporation of blind cooperative jamming [19]]:
The source sends the message with d.o.f. 12 only to relay 1, which requires α1 =
1
2 . Then, the
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Figure 2. Schemes for the case with full CSI: (a) Incorporation of cooperative jamming, (b) Incorporation of message-
beamforming, and (c) Simultaneous alignment and beamforming. Diamond shapes and rectangular shapes illustrate (partial)
messages and noises, respectively, and the number above or below each shape represents its corresponding d.o.f. Same shapes
with same patterns mean the same information. Otherwise, different shapes and/or different patterns represent independent
informations.
relays operate according to the blind cooperative jamming scheme [19] for the wiretap channel with
helpers. Relay 1 sends the message (d.o.f. 12 ) together with its own noise (d.o.f. 12 ) and relay 2 sends
its own noise (d.o.f. 12 ) in a way that the noise signals are aligned at the legitimate destination.
Since the noise signals occupy the entire space at the eavesdropper, the messages can be shown to
be secure.
• [Scheme 5 achieving (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1). Computation for jamming (CoJ)]:
The source adds a noise sequence with d.o.f. 1 to the message codeword with d.o.f. 1 and sends
the resultant sequence, which also has d.o.f. 1, to relay 1. To relay 2, the source sends the noise
sequence used for the addition. This requires α1 = α2 = 1. Then, relays 1 and 2 send what they
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Figure 3. Schemes for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI: (a) Incorporation of blind cooperative jamming and (b) Computation
for jamming. Similarly as in Fig. 2, diamond shapes and rectangular shapes represent (partial) messages and noises, respectively,
with the number above or below each shape corresponding to its d.o.f. Same shapes with same patterns represent the same
information, and otherwise independent informations.
have received in a way that the common noise signals are canceled out at the legitimate destination.
Because the common noise signals occupy the entire space at the eavesdropper, the message can be
shown to be secure.
To show the achievability part of Theorem 1, we perform time-sharing among Scheme 1, Scheme 4,
and any of Schemes 2, 3, and 5. For the achievability part of Theorem 2, we time-share between Schemes
4 and 5. Because Schemes 1, 2, and 4 are straightforward extensions of the previously proposed schemes
in [17], [19], [21], [22], we give a detailed description only for Schemes 3 and 5. To that end, we first
present some achievability results for the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, which corresponds
to the multiple access part of our model where each relay acts as a source having its own message.
In the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel, source k = 1, 2 wishes to send message Wk of rate
Rk to the legitimate destination while keeping it secret from the eavesdropper. A secrecy rate tuple
(R1, R2) is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of codes with block length n such that
limn→∞ P (Wˆ1 6= W1 or Wˆ2 6= W2) = 0 and limn→∞ 1nI(W1,W2;Y n2 |hn,gn) = 0. The following two
theorems give achievable secrecy rate regions for the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel for the
case with full CSI at the sources and the legitimate destination and for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI
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at the sources and the legitimate destination, respectively. Since these theorems are direct consequences
of the achievablility result in [9], their proofs are omitted in this paper.
Theorem 3. For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel with full CSI at the sources and the
legitimate destination, a secrecy rate tuple (R1, R2) is achievable if
∑
k∈S
Rk ≤ I(VS ;Y1|VSc ,h,g) − I(VS ;Y2|h,g)
for all S ⊆ [1 : 2] for some ∏k∈[1:2] p(vk)p(xk|vk,h,g) such that E[X2k ] ≤ P for k = 1, 2.7
Theorem 4. For the Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel with no eavesdropper’s CSI at the sources
and the legitimate destination, a secrecy rate tuple (R1, R2) is achievable if
∑
k∈S
Rk ≤ I(VS ;Y1|VSc ,h)− I(VS ;Y2|h,g)
for all S ⊆ [1 : 2] for some ∏k∈[1:2] p(vk)p(xk|vk,h) such that E[X2k ] ≤ P for k = 1, 2.
Remark 3. Theorems 3 and 4 can be obtained from [9] by applying the technique of adding prefix
channels introduced in [2]. We add prefix channel p(xk|vk,h,g) for the case with full CSI and add
prefix channel p(xk|vk,h) for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI.
Now, let us describe Schemes 3 and 5.
Scheme 3 achieving (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1). Simultaneous alignment and beamforming scheme: The
message W of rate R is split into W1 and W2 each of which having rate R/2. Then, the source sends
Wk to relay k together with a common noise sequence Un generated in an i.i.d. manner according to
Unif[C(a,Q)], where
C(a,Q) = a{−Q,−Q+ 1, · · · , 0, · · · , Q− 1, Q}
for some positive real number a and positive integer Q which will be specified later. This transmission
from the source to the relays imposes the following constraints:
R
2
+ log(2Q+ 1) ≤ C1 (17)
R
2
+ log(2Q+ 1) ≤ C2. (18)
7In Theorems 3 and 4, h = (h1, h2) and g = (g1, g2) denote the random channel fading coefficients generated by
f(h1, h2, g1, g2).
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Now, we apply Theorem 3 for the multiple access part with the following choices of R1, R2, and
p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1,h,g)p(x2|v2,h,g):
R1 = R/2, R2 = R/2
V1 ∼ Unif[C(a,Q)], V2 ∼ Unif[C(a,Q)]
X1 =
(
h2 − g2
g1
h1
)
V1 + h2U, X2 =
(
g1
g2
h2 − h1
)
V2 − h1U.
Then, the channel outputs at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper are given as
Y1 =
(
h1h2 − g2
g1
h21
)
V1 +
(
g1
g2
h22 − h1h2
)
V2 +N1
Y2 = (g1h2 − g2h1)(V1 + V2 + U) +N2,
respectively. According to Theorem 3, the secrecy rate of R is achievable if
R ≤ I(V1, V2;Y1|h,g) − I(V1, V2;Y2|h,g) (19)
R
2
≤ I(V1;Y1|V2,h,g) − I(V1;Y2|h,g) (20)
R
2
≤ I(V2;Y1|V1,h,g) − I(V2;Y2|h,g) (21)
are satisfied.
Let us bound the first term in the RHS of (19). The constellation at the legitimate destination consists
of (2Q + 1)2 points and the minimum distance dmin of which can be bounded using the Khintchine-
Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation [20] as follows: for any δ > 0, there exists a constant
kδ such that
dmin ≥ akδ
Q1+δ
(22)
for almost all channel fading coefficients except a set of Lebesque measure zero. Since the probability
that a realization of channel fading coefficients does not satisfy (22) is negligible, for the sake of brevity,
let us assume that channel fading coefficients satisfy (22) in the subsequent analysis.
Let (Vˆ1, Vˆ2) denote the estimate of (V1, V2) which is chosen as the closest point to Y1 in the constel-
lation. Then, we have
P ((Vˆ1, Vˆ2) 6= (V1, V2)) ≤ exp
(
−d
2
min
8
)
≤ exp
(
− a
2k2δ
8Q2(1+δ)
)
.
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By choosing Q = P
1−δ
2(2+δ) and a = γP
1/2
Q
for some γ > 0, we have
P ((Vˆ1, Vˆ2) 6= (V1, V2)) ≤ exp
(
−γ
2k2δP
δ
8
)
.
To meet the power constraints, we choose γ as follows:
γ =
1√
5L3
≤ min


1√
(h2 − g2g1h1)2 + h22
,
1√
(g1
g2
h2 − h1)2 + h21

 .
According to the Fano’s inequality, it follows that
H(V1, V2|Y1,h,g) ≤ H(V1, V2|Vˆ1, Vˆ2)
≤ 1 + P ((Vˆ1, Vˆ2) 6= (V1, V2)) log(|(V1, V2)| − 1)
≤ 1 + exp
(
−k
2
δP
δ
40L6
)
log (2Q+ 1)2
= o(log P ).
Therefore, the first term in the RHS of (19) can be bounded as
I(V1, V2;Y1|h,g) = H(V1, V2|h,g) −H(V1, V2|Y1,h,g)
≥ log (2Q+ 1)2 − o(log P )
=
1− δ
2 + δ
log P − o(log P ). (23)
For the second term in the RHS of (19), it follows that
I(V1, V2;Y2|h,g)
(a)
≤ I(V1, V2; (g1h2 − g2h1)(V1 + V2 + U)|h,g)
(b)
= I(V1, V2;V1 + V2 + U)
= H(V1 + V2 + U)−H(U)
≤ log(6Q+ 1)− log(2Q+ 1)
= log
(
6Q+ 1
2Q+ 1
)
= o(log P ), (24)
where (a) is due to the Markov chain (V1, V2) − ((g1h2 − g2h1)(V1 + V2 + U),h,g) − Y2 and (b) is
because P (g1h2 − g2h1 = 0) = 0 for our channel model.
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Next, for the first term in the RHS of (20), we have
I(V1;Y1|V2,h,g) = I(V1;Y ′1 |h,g)
= H(V1)−H(V1|Y ′1 ,h,g)
(a)
= H(V1)− h(N1|Y ′1 ,h,g)
≥ H(V1)− h(N1)
= log(2Q+ 1)− 1
2
log 2pie
≥ 1− δ
2(2 + δ)
logP − o(log P ) (25)
for Y ′1 , heffV1 + N1 and heff , h1h2 − g2g1h21, where (a) is because P (heff = 0) = 0 for our channel
model and for given Y ′1 ,h,g with heff 6= 0, V and N1 have a one-to-one relationship. For the second
term in the RHS of (20), we have
I(V1;Y2|h,g) ≤ I(V1, V2;Y2|h,g)
(a)
≤ o(log P ), (26)
where (a) is from (24).
Similarly, for the terms in the RHS of (21), we can show
I(V2;Y1|V1,h,g) ≥ 1− δ
2(2 + δ)
logP − o(log P ) (27)
I(V2;Y2|h,g) ≤ o(log P ). (28)
By substituting (19)-(21) with (23)-(28) and then choosing δ sufficiently small, we have
R ≤ 1
2
log P − o(log P ) (29)
for the multiple access part. From (17), (18), and (29), we conclude that (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1) is
achievable.
Scheme 5 achieving (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1). Computation for jamming scheme: In this scheme, we
wish to apply Theorem 4 for the multiple access part with the following choices of R1, R2, and
p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1,h)p(x2|v2,h):
R1 = R, R2 = 0
V1 ∼ Unif[C(a,Q)], V2 = ∅
X1 =
1
h1
(V1 + U), X2 = − 1
h2
U,
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where U ∼ Unif[C(a,Q)], C(a,Q) = a{−Q,−Q+1, · · · , 0, · · · , Q−1, Q}, Q = P 1−δ2 , and a = 1√
2L
P
δ
2
for δ > 0. Note that the power constraints at the relays are satisfied since 1√
2L
≤ min
{ |h1|√
2
, |h2|
}
.
To that end, one naive approach is to let the source send the message W to relay 1 and send a common
noise sequence Un to both relays 1 and 2, which requires
R+ log(2Q+ 1) ≤ C1
log(2Q+ 1) ≤ C2.
However, there is a cleverer way to enable the aforementioned relay operations, in which the source
computes V n1 (W )+Un and sends the sum to relay 1. To relay 2, the source sends Un. This transmission
from the source to the relays is possible if the following constraints are satisfied:
log(4Q+ 1) ≤ C1 (30)
log(2Q+ 1) ≤ C2. (31)
Now, the channel outputs at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper are given as
Y1 = V1 +N1
Y2 =
g1
h1
V1 +
(
g1
h1
− g2
h2
)
U +N2,
respectively. According to Theorem 4, the following secrecy rate can be achieved.
R ≤ I(V1;Y1|h)− I(V1;Y2|h,g). (32)
Let us bound the first term in the RHS of (32). We have
I(V1;Y1|h) = I(V1;V1 +N1)
= H(V1)−H(V1|V1 +N1)
= H(V1)− h(N1|V1 +N1)
≥ H(V1)− h(N1)
= log(2Q+ 1)− 1
2
log(2pie)
≥ 1− δ
2
logP − o(log P ). (33)
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For the second term in the RHS of (32), it follows that
I(V1;Y2|h,g) = I(V1, U ;Y2|h,g) − I(U ;Y2|V1,h,g)
(a)
≤ I(V1, U ;Y2|h,g) − 1− δ
2
log P + o(log P )
= h(Y2|h,g) − h(Y2|V1, U,h,g) − 1− δ
2
log P + o(log P )
= h(Y2|h,g) − h(N2)− 1− δ
2
log P + o(log P )
(b)
≤ 1
2
log P − 1
2
log 2pie− 1− δ
2
log P + o(log P )
=
δ
2
logP + o(log P ), (34)
where (a) is by applying similar steps as those used for obtaining (25) and (b) is because all channel
fading coefficients are assumed to be bounded away from zero and infinity.
By substituting (32) with (33) and (34) and by choosing δ sufficiently small, we have
R ≤ 1
2
log P + o(log P ) (35)
for the multiple access part. From (30), (31), and (35), we conclude that (α1, α2, ds) = (1, 1, 1) is
achievable.
Now, we are ready to prove the achievability parts of Theorems 1 and 2.
A. Proof for the achievability part of Theorem 1
Note that α1 ≥ α2 without loss of generality in our model. First, consider the case where the minimum
of (4) is equal to α1 + α2, which implies 2α1 + α2 ≤ 1. We use time-sharing technique as follows: use
Scheme 1 for 3α2 fraction of time, use Scheme 4 for 2(α1 − α2) fraction of time, and keep silent for
the remaining fraction.8 Then, it can be easily shown ds = α1 + α2 is achievable. Next, consider the
case where the minimum of (4) is given as 12(1+α2). If α2 ≤ 13 , by using Scheme 1 for 3α2 fraction of
time and using Scheme 4 for 1− 3α2 fraction of time, 12(1+α2) is achievable. If 13 < α2 ≤ 1, by using
Scheme 1 for 32(1−α2) fraction of time and using any of Schemes 2, 3, and 5 for the remaining fraction
of time, 12 (1+α2) is achievable. Finally, consider the case where the minimum of (4) is 1, which implies
α1 ≥ 1 and α2 ≥ 1. By using any of Schemes 2, 3, and 5, ds = 1 is trivially achievable.
8Note that 3α2 + 2(α1 − α2) = 2α1 + α2 ≤ 1.
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B. Proof for the achievability part of Theorem 2
We note that a variant of Scheme 4 where the roles of relays 1 and 2 are swapped can achieve
(α1, α2, ds) = (0,
1
2 ,
1
2 ), and let us call this scheme as Scheme 4
∗
. First, consider the case where the
minimum of (5) is equal to α1 + α2, which implies 2α1 + 2α2 ≤ 1. By using Scheme 4 for 2α1
fraction of time and Scheme 4∗ for 2α2 fraction of time and keeping silent for the remaining fraction,
ds = α1+α2 can be shown to be achievable. Next, consider the case where the minimum of (5) is given
as 13 (1+α1+α2). By using Scheme 4 for
2(α1−2α2+1)
3 fraction, Scheme 4
∗ for 2(α2−2α1+1)3 fraction, and
Scheme 5 for the remaining fraction of time, it can be shown that ds = 13(1 + α1 + α2) is achievable.
Now, consider the case where the minimum of (5) is given as 12(1+α2). We use Scheme 4 for (1−α2)
fraction of time and use Scheme 5 for α2 fraction of time, which achieves ds = 12(1 + α2). Finally,
consider the case where the minimum of (5) is 1, which implies α1 ≥ 1 and α2 ≥ 1. By using Scheme
5, ds = 1 is trivially achievable.
VI. GENERALIZATION TO M RELAYS
In this section, we consider a generalized Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel where there are arbitrary
number of relays. Assume that there are M ≥ 2 relays with transmit power constraint of P . For the
broadcast part, the source is connected to M relays through orthogonal links, where the link capacity
to relay k = 1, . . . ,M is Ck such that limP→∞ Ck1
2
logP
= αk. For the multiple access part, the channel
outputs Y1(t) and Y2(t) at time t at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, are
given as
Y1(t) =
M∑
k=1
hk(t)Xk(t) +N1(t) (36)
Y2(t) =
M∑
k=1
gk(t)Xk(t) +N2(t), (37)
in which Xk(t) is the channel input at relay k, hk(t)’s and gk(t)’s are channel fading coefficients to the
legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively, and N1(t) and N2(t) are independent Gaussian
noise with zero mean and unit variance at the legitimate destination and the eavesdropper, respectively,
at time t. Similarly as in Section II, we assume fast fading9, no CSI at the source, and full CSI at
9Similarly as for the two-relay case in Section II, we assume that the channel fading coefficients are generated from a real-
valued joint density function whose all joint and conditional density functions are bounded and whose support set does not
contain zero and infinity.
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the eavesdropper, and consider the two cases regarding the availability of CSI at the relays and the
legitimate destination, i.e., the case with full CSI and the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI. A secrecy
code, secrecy capacity, and secure d.o.f. are defined by a straightforward generalization from Section II.
For the brevity of the results, we focus on the symmetric case with C1 = · · · = CM = C , which implies
α1 = · · · = αM = α.
The following two theorems present our results on the secure d.o.f. for the case with full CSI and for
the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively.
Theorem 5. For the generalized Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with M ≥ 2 relays with full CSI at
the relays and the legitimate destination, the secure d.o.f. satisfies
ds,− ≤ ds ≤ ds,+,
where
ds,+ = min
{
Mα,
M − 1
M
(1 + α), 1
}
,
ds,− = min
{
Mα,
2M(M − 1) +M2α
2M2 −M + 2 , 1
}
.
Theorem 6. For the generalized Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with M ≥ 2 relays with no eaves-
dropper’s CSI at the relays and the legitimate destination, the secure d.o.f. is equal to
ds = min
{
Mα,
Mα+M − 1
M + 1
, 1
}
.
In Fig. 4, the results in Theorems 5 and 6 are illustrated for M = 2, 3, 5. For the case with full
CSI with M > 2, there exists a gap between the lower and upper bounds on the secure d.o.f., which
decreases as M increases. We note that up to the threshold value M−1
M(M−1)+1) (resp., M−1M2 ) of α for the
case with full CSI (resp., for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI), the secure d.o.f is linear in M and
α. In this regime, the broadcast part becomes the bottleneck and hence it is optimal to send independent
partial messages to the relays and to incorporate the cooperative jamming scheme [17] (resp., the blind
cooperative jamming scheme [19]) for the multiple access part. After this threshold value of α, the source
needs to send some common information to the relays to achieve a higher secure d.o.f. and hence the
slope of secure d.o.f. in α becomes lower. If α is 1
M
+ 2
M2
for the case with full CSI (resp., 2
M
for the
case with no eavesdropper’s CSI), one secure d.o.f. can be achieved by generalizing the S-AB scheme
(resp., the CoJ scheme) in Section V. We note that there is a gap between the secure d.o.f.’s with and
without eavesdropper’s CSI for α ∈ (M−1
M2
, 2
M
)
, and there is no loss in secure d.o.f. for other ranges of
α.
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Figure 4. Secure d.o.f. of the generalized Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel with M relays
Theorems 5 and 6 can be proved by generalizing the proof techniques in Sections IV and V. In the
following, we provide brief proofs for these theorems.
A. Converse
Similarly as in Section IV, there is no loss of secure d.o.f. in considering the following deterministic
model with integer-input and integer-output for the multiple access part, instead of the original channel
(36) and (37):
Y1(t) =
M∑
k=1
⌊hk(t)Xk(t)⌋, Y2(t) =
M∑
k=1
⌊gk(t)Xk(t)⌋ (38)
with the constraint
Xk ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ⌊
√
P ⌋}, k = 1, . . . ,M. (39)
Hence, in this subsection, let us assume that the multiple access part is given as (38) and (39). In addition,
the channel fading coefficients are conditioned in every entropy and mutual information terms in this
subsection due to the same reason as in Section IV, but are omitted for notational convenience. c′i’s for
i = 1, 2, 3, . . . are used to denote positive constants that do not depend on n and P .
1) Proof for the converse part of Theorem 5: We generalize the converse proof technique in Section
IV-A for multiple relays. We can obtain the following inequality by applying similar techniques used to
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obtain (11):
nR ≤
M∑
k=2
H(Jk) +
M∑
k=2
H(Xnk |Jk) + nc′1. (40)
On the other hand, we can generalize (14) for multiple relays as follows:
nR ≤ H(Y n1 )−H(Xnk |Jk) + nc′2, k = 2, · · · ,M. (41)
By combining (40) and (41), we have
MnR ≤
M∑
k=2
H(Jk) + (M − 1)H(Y n1 ) + nc′3
≤ (M − 1)nC + (M − 1)H(Y n1 ) + nc′3.
It follows that
R ≤ M − 1
M
(
1
2
logP + C
)
+ c′4
or
ds ≤ M − 1
M
(1 + α).
Together with the following bound from the cutset bound, this completes the proof,
ds ≤ min{Mα, 1}. (42)
2) Proof for the converse part of Theorem 6: We extend the converse proof technique in Section IV-B
for multiple relays. First, we can generalize (15) for multiple relays as follows:
nR ≤
M∑
k=1
H(Jk) +
M∑
k=1
H(Xnk |Jk)−H(Y n2 ) + nc′5. (43)
Next, the following inequality can be obtained by applying similar techniques used in deriving (16):
nR ≤ H(Y n1 )−H(Xnk |Jk) + nc′6, k = 1, . . . ,M (44)
Combining (43) and (44), we have
(M + 1)nR ≤
M∑
k=1
H(Jk) +MH(Y
n
1 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc′7
≤MnC + (M − 1)H(Y n1 ) +H(Y n1 )−H(Y n2 ) + nc′7
(a)
≤ MnC + (M − 1)H(Y n1 ) + n · o(log P ) + nc′7,
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where (a) is because the difference H(Y n1 ) − H(Y n2 ) can not be larger than n · o(log P ) for the case
with no eavesdropper’s CSI from Section 6 of [29].10 In terms of d.o.f., equivalently, we have
ds ≤ Mα+M − 1
M + 1
.
Combining with the bound (42) from the cutset bound, we finish the proof.
B. Achievability
1) Proof for the achievability part of Theorem 5: Note that it is sufficient to show that the following
two corner points are achievable: (α, ds) =
(
M−1
M(M−1)+1 ,
M(M−1)
M(M−1)+1
)
and (α, ds) =
(
1
M
+ 2
M2
, 1
)
. For
the first corner point, the message with d.o.f. M(M−1)
M(M−1)+1 is split into M independent partial messages
each with d.o.f M−1
M(M−1)+1 . The source sends each partial message to each different relay, which requires
α = M−1
M(M−1)+1 . Then, the relays operate according to the cooperative jamming scheme in [17] for the
Gaussian multiple access-wiretap channel.
To show (α, ds) =
(
1
M
+ 2
M2
, 1
)
is achievable, we propose M(M−1)2 sub-schemes, where the (i, j)-th
sub-scheme for i ∈ [1 : M ] and j ∈ [1 : M ] such that j > i achieves αi = αj = 2M , αk = 1M
for k /∈ {i, j}, and ds = 1. By time-sharing among these sub-schemes uniformly, we can prove that
(α, ds) =
(
1
M
+ 2
M2
, 1
)
is achievable. Each sub-scheme is generalized from the S-AB scheme proposed
in Section V. In Fig. 5-(b), the (1,2)-th subscheme is illustrated for M = 4. The message with d.o.f. 1
is split into M independent partial messages each with d.o.f 1
M
. In the (i, j)-th sub-scheme, the source
sends each partial message to each different relay and sends a common noise with d.o.f. 1
M
to relays i
and j in addition to the partial messages, which requires αi = αj = 2M and αk =
1
M
for k /∈ {i, j}.
Then, each relay transmits what it has received in a way that the common noise signals are beam-formed
in the null space of the legitimate destination’s channel and the partial message signals are aligned with
and are perfectly masked by the common noise signal at the eavesdropper.
2) Proof for the achievability part of Theorem 6: Note that it is sufficient to show that the following two
corner points are achievable: (α, ds) = (M−1M2 ,
M−1
M
) and (α, ds) = ( 2M , 1). First, (α, ds) = (
M−1
M2
, M−1
M
)
can be shown to be achievable by uniformly time-sharing M sub-schemes, where the k-th sub-scheme
for k ∈ [1 : M ] achieves αk = M−1M , αj = 0 for j 6= k, and ds = M−1M . Each sub-scheme is a direct
extension of the blind cooperative jamming scheme [19] for the wiretap channel with helpers, i.e., for
the k-th sub-scheme, the source sends the message with d.o.f. M−1
M
to relay k and the relays operate
10The channel assumption in [29] is satisfied under our channel model.
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according to the blind cooperative jamming scheme [19] as if relay k is the source and the other relays
are the helpers.
Next, (α, ds) = ( 2M , 1) can be shown to be achievable by uniformly time-sharing
M(M−1)
2 sub-schemes,
where the (i, j)-th sub-scheme for i ∈ [1 : M ] and j ∈ [1 : M ] such that j > i achieves αi = αj = 1,
αk = 0 for k /∈ {i, j}, and ds = 1. Each sub-scheme is the same as the CoJ scheme proposed in Section
V, i.e., in the (i, j)-th scheme, we use the CoJ scheme as if there are only two relays i and j.
Remark 4. We note that a generalization of the message-beamforming scheme in Section V for the case
with M -relays achieves (α, ds) = ( 2M , 1). Hence, the S-AB scheme outperforms the message-beamforming
scheme for M > 2. To see the intuition behind this, we illustrate some instances of using these two schemes
for M = 4 in Fig. 5, where both the schemes achieve one secure d.o.f. but the S-AB scheme uses less link
d.o.f.’s at the broadcast part. For the message-beamforming scheme, every pair of two relays has to send
a common partial message to beam-form each partial message. For the S-AB scheme, once two relays
have common noise and independent partial messages as in the two-relay case, the other relays can send
independent partial messages without common noise since the same common noise can be used to mask
all the partial messages simultaneously. Hence, the S-AB scheme requires less ‘common’ information and
thus is more efficient in the use of the broadcast links.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we established the exact secure d.o.f. of the Gaussian diamond-wiretap channel and
generalized the results for multiple relays. We considered both the case with full CSI and the case with
no eavesdropper’s CSI, at the relays and the legitimate destination. Our results show that the absence of
the eavesdropper’s CSI reduces the secure d.o.f. for some range of moderate link d.o.f.’s of the broadcast
part, but its effect decreases as the number of relays increases. For the converse part, we introduced a new
technique of capturing the trade-off between the message rate and the amount of individual randomness
injected at each relay. For the achievability part, we newly proposed a simultaneous alignment and
beamforming (S-AB) scheme and a computation for jamming (CoJ) scheme for the case with full CSI
and for the case with no eavesdropper’s CSI, respectively. Both the schemes incorporate transmitting
common noise from the source to the relays and beamforming of common noise signals in the null space
of the legitimate destination’s channel. The S-AB scheme involves aligning the message and the common
noise signals at the eavesdropper simultaneously with the beamforming of the common noise signals.
By doing so, it utilizes common information more efficiently than the message-beamforming scheme
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Figure 5. Comparison between (a) the message-beamforming scheme and (b) the S-AB scheme for M = 4. Similarly as in
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, diamond shapes and rectangular shapes represent (partial) messages and noises, respectively, with the number
above or below each shape corresponding to its d.o.f. Same shapes with same patterns represent the same information, and
otherwise independent informations.
for more than two relays. The CoJ scheme involves computation between the message and the common
noise symbols at the source, which requires less link d.o.f.’s at the broadcast part than naively sending
the message and the common noise separately.
We note that our proposed schemes utilize the common information sent from the source to the two
relays. It might be interesting to extend these schemes for the scenario where the relays are allowed to
conference to generate common noise or share common message, which is similar to the setting of [31]
for the diamond channel with no secrecy constraint. As a final remark, we note that our CoJ scheme can
be useful in keeping the message secret from the relays. Exploiting such a feature can be an interesting
further work for the scenario where the source has common and confidential messages to each of the
relays and the legitimate destination.
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